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Abstract—Network address shuffling is one of moving target
defense (MTD) techniques that can invalidate the address infor-
mation attackers have collected based on the current network IP
configuration. We propose a software-defined networking-based
MTD technique called Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing,
namely FRVM, which aims to defend against network reconnais-
sance and scanning attacks. FRVM enables a host machine to
have multiple, random, time-varying virtual IP addresses, which
are multiplexed to a real IP address of the host. Multiplexing or
de-multiplexing event dynamically remaps all the virtual network
addresses of the hosts. Therefore, at the end of a multiplexing
event, FRVM aims to make the attackers lose any knowledge
gained through the reconnaissance and to disturb their scanning
strategy. In this work, we analyze and evaluate our proposed
FRVM in terms of the attack success probability under scanning
attacks and target host discovery attacks.
Index Terms—Network address shuffling, IP multiplexing,
moving target defense, scanning attacks, attack success prob-
ability, software-defined networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional networked systems have been characterized by
static system configurations which can greatly provide benefits
to attackers in terms of their resource utilization in time and
effort. The attackers often enjoy the asymmetric advantages
because they can take enough time to investigate a target
system by collecting its configuration information to identify
exploitable vulnerabilities. Based on the obtained intelligence
towards the system configuration, the attackers can plan to
launch their attacks in order to maximize their utility and
success.
The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has been
introduced to increase uncertainty and/or confusion for at-
tackers by continuously and dynamically changing the attack
surface on a system. The dynamic defense based on MTD
techniques has been often applied at a system level and/or a
network level [19]. At the system level, the example MTD
techniques aim to change system configurations in terms of
instruction sets [4, 11, 20], run-time configuration [26], or
IP address shuffling [22]. At the network level, the common
MTD technique is related to the shuffling of network attributes,
including shuffling of MAC address, IP address, and/or Port
number [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 23, 27, 24, 25].
One of well-known network address obfuscation techniques
is randomly and dynamically changing an IP address of a
host [1, 8, 9]. The 1-to-1 mapping technique from a real
IP (rIP) to a virtual IP (vIP) is addressed in OpenFlow
Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM) [8], RHM [1], and spatio-
temporal address mutation [9]. One-to-one address mapping
requires more vIPs to satisfy the mutation rate constraint and
unpredictability for hosts in the network, which often result in
lack of scalability due to a limited address space.
In this paper, we propose an MTD technique called Flexible
Random Virtual IP Multiplexing (FRVM) in a software defined
networking (SDN) environment which enables a host to have
multiple, random, and/or time-varying virtual IP addresses
(vIPs). The vIPs are changed randomly and dynamically in
order to invalidate a target system’s information collected by
adversaries. FRVM creates short-lived vIPs to hide the real IP
addresses (rIPs) of end-hosts. It allows a full range of vIPs to a
host for different services by mapping in an M−to−N manner
where M refers to the number of rIP and N is the number of
vIP. The vIPs are changed randomly and continuously where
they can lower down predictability of the changing patterns
of IP addresses by attackers. The rIP of an end-host remains
unchanged and is transparent to the end user. This SDN-
based MTD solution defends against network reconnaissance
and scanning attacks. We consider scanning attacks used for
gathering system configuration information before the actual
attacks have launched. An attacker often uses a customized
set of software tools to scan the target system to identify
information such as operating system types, IP addresses, port
numbers, running services, protocols, network topology, and/or
exploitable vulnerabilities. The proposed FRVM provides high
network diversity in terms of IP addresses of end-hosts that
can significantly disturbs the attacker’s scanning strategies and
accordingly reduces the attacker’s success rate. This work
makes the following key contributions:
• We presented an efficient novel SDN-based MTD mech-
anism that provides flexibility to have multiple, random,
time-variant IP addresses in a host, and this creates an en-
vironment with high diversity that significantly decrease
the attacker’s scanning success rate;
• We formulated the architectural framework and outline
communication protocols of FRVM, in which it is feasible
to be implemented on an SDN environment; and
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• We derived probabilistic models for analyzing and evalu-
ating the effectiveness of FRVM; and our experimental re-
sults clearly support the outperformance of our proposed
FRVM compared to the baseline and existing counterpart,
with respect to defense strength.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
provides the overview of SDN environments and IP shuffling
techniques as an MTD mechanism. Section III discusses the
network and threat models considered in this work. Section IV
describes the overall design of the proposed FRVM in terms
of IP mapping, architecture, and communication protocol.
Section V provides a probability model for the analytical
validation of the proposed FRVM. Section VI demonstrates
the experimental results and discusses their overall trends with
physical interpretations. Lastly, Section VII concludes this
work and suggests the future work directions.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
A. Software-Defined Networking
A conventional network consists of heterogeneous com-
ponents, such as switches, firewalls, and routers with their
own proprietary software and protocols. This kind of network
setup is rarely flexible, which significantly hurdles applying
diverse, novel ideas to optimize system performance and
security. Software-defined networking (SDN) has emerged to
mitigate the issues with which the existing traditional networks
have faced [21] by decoupling the network control and the
forwarding functions that provide high programmability and
efficient abstraction of applications and network services in the
underlying infrastructure [13]. An SDN environment consists
of SDN switches and controllers, communicating over a secure
channel. Many SDN switch protocols have been developed
in which one of well-known protocols is an OpenFlow [18]
protocol, a fundamental element for building the SDN en-
vironment. The SDN’s programmable interfaces help build
dynamic, proactive, and adaptive defense mechanisms such
as MTD techniques.
B. IP Shuffling
Network address shuffling is one of MTD techniques whose
key approach is to dynamically and frequently change IP
addresses and port numbers of a target system. Antonatos et al.
[2] proposed a network address space randomization scheme
(NASR) to deal with hitlist worms. NASR is a local area net-
work (LAN)-level network address randomization technique
based on the dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP)
updates. Although NASR reflects the nature of shuffling based
on the IP address randomization as an MTD mechanism, it
disrupts the active connections and has limitations in providing
high unpredictability and mutation speed due to constrained
address space in terms of a LAN address. Shi et al. [23]
developed an active cyber-defense mechanism based on port
and address hopping with timestamp-based synchronization.
However, this cyber-defense mechanism is developed to deal
with Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks only within the scope of
metropolitan area networks (MANs) and multiple LANs.
Various types of IP address shuffling techniques have been
proposed in the literature. Open-Flow Random Host Mutation
(OF-RHM) [8] is an IP address shuffling technique that
randomly mutates IP address of the end-hosts. In OF-RHM,
the real IP address of the end-hosts remain unchanged while
associating with a short-lived virtual IP address (vIP) where
vIPs are randomly and periodically changed. The translation
of vIP-to-rIP is performed right before the end-host. A vIP is
chosen from the range after each mutation interval. The vIP
is uniformly selected at random or with an associated weight.
The OF-RHM is implemented on an SDN environment, in
which each OF-switch performs vIP-to-rIP and rIP-to-vIP
translations as specified by an SDN controller. Although the
OF-RHM is transparent to end-hosts and provides the high
mutation rate, it cannot be deployed in a conventional network
due to low scalability.
Al-Shaer et al. [1] proposed Random Host Mutation (RHM)
to solve the scalability problem in conventional networks.
RHM uses a two-phase mutation approach consisting of Low
Frequency Mutation (LFM) and High Frequency Mutation
(HFM) intervals to assign vIP. LFM is used to optimally
select a random network address for moving target hosts (i.e.,
denoted by virtual address range, or VAR) under constraints
while HFM is used to select random vIP within VAR assigned
during LFM. The virtual address space allocation is performed
by the moving target controller and the translation between
rIP and vIP is performed by moving target gateway (MTG).
The RHM is implemented in a traditional campus network
with the validation of its effectiveness in dealing with internal
and external scanners. However, this work didn’t consider the
effectiveness of the RHM against more intelligent attacks such
as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs).
Jafarian et al. [9] also presented a spatio-temporal ad-
dress mutation technique which aims to mitigate the impact
of sophisticated APTs in enterprise networks. This scheme
presented dynamicity into a network by invalidating the in-
formation attackers collected during the reconnaissance at
one host that can be used at other time and other hosts
by varying host IP binding dynamically based on location
and time. Each host is associated with the unique set of IP
address called ‘ephemeral IP’ (eIP) to reach other hosts in the
network. This approach is implemented on a legacy network;
but its effectiveness is evaluated on the SDN environment.
The translation of rIP-to/from-eIP is performed in the gateway
of the conventional network, and OF-Switch of the SDN
environment. This work investigated the effectiveness of their
scheme using three metrics, including deterrence, deception,
and detectability, under attacks such as cooperative and local
preference worms and/or APT attacks.
In this work, we propose the FRVM as an MTD mechanism
in order to map IP addresses in an M -to-N manner, which
provides high flexibility in IP mapping while generating high
diversity to enhance security. We validate the outperformance
of FRVM in terms of reducing attack success rate under
scanning attacks and accordingly discovering target hosts. Our
experimental results show that the proposed FRVM signifi-
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cantly provides an effective MTD mechanism by providing
high network diversity, ultimately leading to enhancing system
and network security.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we discuss our network and threat models
that describe assumptions made and attack behaviors consid-
ered in this work.
A. Network Model
We consider an SDN-based environment in which end-hosts
are called server-hosts which offer a number of services to end-
users. Each server-host should have at least one active service
where a server can have multiple services. The active services
running on server-hosts are identified by the port numbers,
and a vIP is assigned to each service. A combination of vIP
and port number (i.e., vIP: Port) can be used to communicate
within the SDN-based network environment. Fig. 1 describes
our system model consisting of the control plane with a
controller (e.g., an SDN controller) and the data plan with
switches and hosts (e.g., OpenFlow switches and server-hosts).
B. Threat Model
An attacker seeks to perform reconnaissance on the network
while the system defense mechanism aims to hide the IP
addresses and port numbers. The attacker selects a random IP
address and port number to discover the host (i.e., IP address)
and active services (i.e., ports) on the host for planning and
launching attacks. In this work, an attacker is assumed to
have some level of knowledge towards a target system and
its defense capability as follows:
• n number of hosts (i.e., the number of servers) exist
where each host has a real IP address, rIP.
• m-active services are running on each server host.
• An attacker targets a service running on a server-host by
performing the target server’s vIP and port scanning.
• The attacker is aware of the virtual address space pool
and will sequentially attempt k connections or probes.
• The attacker uses a scanner (e.g., Nmap [16]) to discover
active server hosts and active services running on the
target end-host.
• The multiplexing event dynamically remaps all vIPs at
the server host by uniformly selecting vIPs at random.
IV. FLEXIBLE RANDOM VIRTUAL IP MULTIPLEXING
In this section, we present our proposed MTD mecha-
nism, called Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing, namely
FRVM, that provides the network address diversity by multi-
plexing and de-multiplexing IP addresses of a target end-host.
A. IP Mapping
In FRVM, each server-host has a real IP address, rIP, where
the rIP is mapped to a set of virtual IP addresses, vIPs,
and a set of vIPs are mapped to an rIP in an 1-to-n/n-to-
1 manner, respectively. The mapping of one or more vIPs to
an rIP (i.e., vIPs-to-rIP) of each server-host is called ‘virtual
IP multiplexing’ while the mapping of a rIP to vIPs mapping
is called ‘de-multiplexing.’ Real IP addresses are public IP
addresses while the vIPs are unused, private IP addresses (e.g.,
10.0.0.0/24, 172.16.0.0/20 or 192.168.0.0/16). We define the
multiplexing function in Eq. (1) that describes the multiplexing
of a set of vIPs (e.g.,vIP1, vIP2, · · · , vIPm) to a set of rIPs
(e.g., a rIP1) in m-to-1 manner. Similarly, the de-multiplexing
function in Eq. (2) details the de-multiplexing of a set of rIPs
(e.g., rIP1) to a set of vIPs (e.g., vIP1, vIP2, · · · , vIPn) in an
1-to-n manner. To perform multiplexing/de-multiplexing of IP
addresses, Eqs. (1) and (2) combine a vIP with a port number
(e.g., vIP : port).
fmultiplexing : VIP→ RIP (1)
fde−multiplexing : RIP→ VIP (2)
As described in Section III-B, each server-host offers one
or more services, and these services are identified with the
corresponding port number. A new vIP is generated randomly
using a cryptographically secured random number generator
and assigned to the server-host’s service. All the randomly
assigned vIPs to the server-host are changed continuously
based on a short period of the interval, called ‘multiplexing
interval,’ denoted by T . The rIP of the server-host remains
unchanged while rIP is hidden in the network and routing is
restricted to using vIPs. The SDN controller handles all the
mapping and remapping of addresses, changing of vIPs of the
server-host and updating the flow-table entry of SDN switches
(e.g., Open-Flow-Switches). The controller performs mapping
of vIPs-to-rIP or rIP-to-vIP at edge switch (i.e., just before the
end-host). The mapping is transparent to an end user with no
service disruption since rIPs and corresponding port numbers
of a server-host remain unchanged. We assume that no one can
reach to the server-host using the rIP except the authorized
network administrators. A user can communicate either using
a domain name/host-name or rIP, which are described as the
communication protocol in FRVM in Section IV-C.
B. System Architecture
FRVM is implemented on an SDN-based environment, as
described in Fig. 1. The FRVM architecture consists of the
following components: end-hosts, an SDN controller, SDN
switches, data plane, and control plane. The end-hosts are
connected with the SDN-switches in the data plane. Data for-
warding network elements are centrally controlled by the SDN
controller. The components of the FRVM system architecture
can be represented by:
• End-host(s): A set of end-hosts includes servers, work-
stations, and/or gateway interface to routers, denoted
by H = {Host1, Host2, · · · , Hostn} where |H| ≥ 2.
Each end-host has an rIP assigned to it and a set of rIPs
is denoted by RIP = {rIP1, rIP2, · · · , rIPn}. A rIP
is mapped to one or more vIPs, and a set of all vIPs
is denoted by VIP = {vIP1, vIP2, · · · , vIPm}. End-
host offers a number of active services listening on port
numbers.
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Fig. 1: FRVM implementation on an SDN-based environment.
• SDN Controller: A set controllers, denoted by C =
{C1, C2, · · · , Cm}. We assume that a functional SDN
network has at least one controller where |C| ≥ 1. In
our system, a single SDN controller exists to perform the
mapping of rIP-to-vIP or vIP-to-rIP, and install necessary
flows in the SDN-switches. The SDN controller randomly
and dynamically changes vIPs of end-hosts and rIPs of
the end-host machines remain unchanged.
• SDN-switches: A set of SDN-witches, denoted by S =
{S1, S2, · · · , Sk}. Each SDN-switch forwards the data
plane traffics based on the flow-rule specified by the SDN
controllers. Each switch, Si, includes ingress and egress
ports.
• Data plane: Representing a topological connectivity
based on a set of network switches and end-hosts.
• Control plane: Representing relations between switches
and controllers.
• End-users: A set of legitimate users, denoted
by U={u1, u2, · · · , uj} that access the services running
on the servers in H.
• DNS servers: The domain name system (DNS) server
resolves a domain name of the server-host and returns
a rIP address.
The IP multiplexing algorithm for an SDN-controller is
presented in Algorithm 1. The SDN-switch sends every un-
matched packet to the controller which determines the types
of communication (e.g., domain-name or rIP), performs the
translation of IP addresses, and installs necessary flows. The
SDN-controller maps a real IP address of the destination host
to a number of virtual IP addresses and then updates the
flow table of each SDN-switch (e.g., OF-switch). For example,
Table I shows the state of a flow-table of an OF-switch where
destination rIPs are replaced with the vIPs. Table II shows the
mapping of 1-to-n/n-to-1 IP addresses using this algorithm.
All rIPs hidden within the SDN network packets are forwarded
using the vIPs only. The SDN controller dynamically changes
vIPs for each service of a server-host in every multiplexing
time interval, T .
C. Communication Protocol
There are two ways of communicating either using ’domain-
name’ or rIP, which is shown in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows that when a DNS query is sent to resolve the
domain-name (e.g, d name) of an end-host (e.g., Host2), then
the DNS response is intercepted by the SDN controller and
the rIP of the destination host (e.g, rIP2) is replaced with the
virtual IP address (e.g., vIP1). As a result, the source end-
host (e.g., Host1) receives only a vIP (e.g., vIP2) mapping
to the destination host and initiates its communication with
the destination service port number (e.g., Port2). Similarly, a
source host’s rIP (e.g., rIP1) of an outgoing packet is replaced
by a randomly selected vIP (e.g., vIP1). The SDN controller
installs necessary flows in the SDN-switches in the route.
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TABLE I: Flow-table for a OF-Switch
Src IP Dst IP Dst Port# Action
IPA 10.0.0.103 80 Forward to PORT 1 with Dst IP 10.0.0.103 and Dst Port#80
IPB 10.0.0.103 80 Forward to PORT 1 with Dst IP 10.0.0.103 and Dst Port#80
IPC 10.0.0.100 23 Forward to PORT 2 with Dst IP 10.0.0.100 and Dst Port#23
IPD 192.168.0.31 21 Forward to PORT 3 with Dst IP 192.168.0.31 and Dst Port#21
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Multiplexing IP Addresses
1: for packets p from host hi to hj do
2: if p is a Type-A DNS response for host hj then
3: Set dstAddr(p):=vIP(hj):dstPort
4: else
5: if hi is authorized access to hj then
6: Set dstAddr(p):=vIP(hj):dstPort
7: end if
8: end if
9: if p is at source SDN-Switch then
10: Set scrAddr(p):=vIP(hi):srcPort
11: Set dstAddr(p):=rIP(hi):dstPort
12: end if
13: if p is at destination SDN-Switch then
14: Set dstAddr(p):=rIP(hj):dstPort
15: Set scrAddr(p):=vIP(hj):srcPort
16: end if
17: for each service of a host hi do
18: Select a new vIP for each service of hi
19: Update flow table entry
20: end for
21: end for
TABLE II: Example of IP address De/multiplexing
Real IP TCP Port# Virtual IP
23 10.0.0.100
80 192.168.0.31rIP 1
25 10.0.0.103
21 192.168.0.31
rIP 2 25 10.0.0.100
rIP 3 80 10.0.0.103
Further, packets will be matched and forwarded by the SDN-
switches according to the installed flows in the flow table. The
translation of the vIP-to-rIP will be applied at the SDN-switch
before the destination end-host.
Fig. 3 shows how an authorized user at a host (e.g., Host1)
can reach an end-host (e,g., Host2) using the real IP address.
We assume that only an authorized user (e.g., a network
administrator) is allowed to communicate using rIP of the
destination host. In this scenario, the client initiates connection
using rIP (e.g., rIP2) and port number (e.g., Port2) of
the destination host (e.g., Host2), and the SDN controller
requesting authorization for a received packet from the source
host (e.g., Host1). If an access is granted, the SDN controller
replaces the rIP of the destination host (e.g., rIP2) with a
randomly generated vIP (e.g., vIP2), and then sends the packet
to the SDN controller which installs necessary flows in the
SDN-switches. The authorization is assumed to be performed
per TCP or UDP connection. In the FRVM network, routing
is restricted to use only vIPs while rIPs are hidden within
the network. The multiplexing and de-multiplexing functions
enable the association between the destination port and the IP
address.
V. PROBABILISTIC DERIVATION OF ATTACK SUCCESS
PROBABILITY
For the IP configuration in a static network, the IP addresses
assigned to end-hosts remain unchanged in the network. An at-
tacker’s strategy for discovering a target host is to sequentially
scan and iterate through the address space. The attack success
probability then is determined via hyper-geometric distribution
as the number of success in a sequence of k-draws from a finite
population without replacement. Accordingly, the probability
that the attacker successfully obtains exactly x of n hosts in
the address space N in k scans can be given by:
P (X = x) =
(
n
x
)(
N−n
k−x
)(
N
k
) (3)
where k ≥ x, N ≥ n, and n ≥ x. The probability that the
attacker successfully discovers at least one target host is:
P (X > 0) = 1− P (X = 0) = 1−
(
N−n
k
)(
N
k
) (4)
In our work, an address shuffling event (e.g., multiplexing
or de-multiplexing event) remaps all vIPs to the end-hosts.
We assume that FRVM remaps all the IP addresses of hosts
in every scanning attempt where the equal rate for shuffling
and scanning is assumed. An attacker loses any reconnais-
sance knowledge gained in every shuffling event. The attacker
success probability remains same upon every scanning. The
attacker has to scan all the IP address in each scan for
discovering the target end-host. Due to this reason, the attacker
success probability (ASP) is determined through a binomial
distribution as the number of success in a sequence of k-
draws from a finite population with replacement. The binomial
probability distribution function with the success probability
p is:
P (X = x) =
(
k
x
)
px(1− p)k−x (5)
where p = nN is the probability that the attacker discovers a
host and k ≥ x. This binomial probability function in Eq. (5)
can be used to estimate the attacker success rate, given the
network address space (N ), the number of hosts (n), and the
number of scans (k) in this work. Therefore, the ASP for an
attacker to discover a host in k scans is given by:
P (X > 0) = 1− P (X = 0) = 1− (1− p)k = 1− (1− 1
N
)k
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Fig. 2: Communication via domain-name.
Fig. 3: Communications via real IP.
If the attacker scans whole address space (i.e., k = N ), then
Eq. (6) reduces to
P (0 < X ≤ N) = 1− (1− 1
N
)N . (6)
As the network address space N increases to a sufficiently
large number (i.e., N →∞), the ASP converges to 1− (1−
1
N )
N = 1− e−1 ≈ 0.63.
Denote a multiplexing interval by T , a multiplexing rate of
each server host by θ where θ = 1T , a scanning rate by η (i.e.,
the number of probing packets that a scanner host sent out
per second), the ratio of attacker scanning rate over defender
multiplexing rate by r where r = ηθ , and the number of scans
by k. If the scanning rate is as same as the multiplexing rate
(i.e., r = 1, the multiplexing event reshuffles IPs per scan),
the attacker will miss the target host with probability (1− 1N )
for every scan and probability (1 − 1N )k in k-scans. If the
attacker scans entire address k = N , then the attacker will
miss the host with probability (1 − 1N )N = e−1 ≈ 0.37. If
r < 1, the attacker cannot scan the whole address space in each
multiplexing interval, T . If the scanner rate is greater than the
multiplexing rate with r > 1 (i.e., k > N ), the attacker will
be able to scan all the addresses.
VI. RESULTS & ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Setup
In this work, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness
of FRVM under scanning attacks with respect to the attack
success probability. As discussed in Section III-B, the attacker
seeks to perform reconnaissance on the network while defense
mechanism aims to keep the IP addresses (e.g., vIPs) hidden.
An attacker selects a random IP address to discover a target
server-host, and then performs port scanning on the host to
discover the active services. We consider a random scanning
strategy (e.g., non-repeat scanning) to discover IP addresses
of the target server hosts and active service running ports
of the target server host. The active server-host discovery
(e.g., IP addresses) can be achieved through sending an ICMP
message to the target server host. Similarly, discovering the
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active services can be achieved by sending a SYN packet
to the target server service using port scanning. The attacker
success probability (e.g., scanner success rate) and overhead
(e.g., flow-table size) are used to evaluate the effectiveness of
the FRVM and its counterpart, a static network that uses a
static IP configuration.
The attacker success probability (ASP) is affected by vari-
ous environmental parameters, such as the address space size,
number of scans, scanning rate, and/or shuffling rate of defense
mechanism. The ASP is obtained based on Eqs. (4) and (6)
for both the static network configuration and the network with
FRVM, respectively.
B. Results
Effect of scanning attacks: Fig. 4 (a) shows that the ASP
increases as the number of scans increases. For the static
network, the ASP reaches to 1.0 (i.e., 100%) when the attacker
scanned the whole address space. However, in the network
with FRVM, the ASP slightly increases as the number of scans
increases; the ASP reaches up to 0.63 (i.e., 63%) when the
attacker scanned the whole address space. This implies that
the attacker missed 37% of the hosts when they scanned the
whole network addresses.
Effect of discovering a virtual IP address attack: Sim-
ilarly, Fig. 4 (b) depicts the ASP when the attackers aim to
discover a virtual IP address in the range of IPv4 Class-A
(i.e., 10.0.0.0/24), Class-B (i.e.,172.16.0.0/20 ), and Class-C
(i.e., 192.168.0.0/16) with respect to the number of scans.
Fig. 4 (b) shows that the scanning success probability is
0.63 in scanning all the virtual IP addresses of Class-C (i.e.,
216 = 65, 536). A large number of scans (k) is required
to discover the virtual IP addresses of Class-B; furthermore,
extensively a large number of scans is required to discover the
virtual IP address of Class-A while the attacker missed 37%
IP addresses even when scanning all the IP addresses (i.e.,
216 + 220 + 224 = 17, 891, 328).
ASP under a single target host: Let us consider another
example with five server-hosts (n = 5) and initial five IP ad-
dresses where vIP1, vIP2, vIP3, vIP4 and vIP5 are randomly
assigned to each host, Host1, Host2, Host3, Host4, and
Host5 from address space (N = 65, 536, 192.168.00.00/16),
respectively. The ASP computed for both networks, the static
network with no MTD and the network with FRVM, given
the number of scans (k). The result in Fig. 4 (c) shows that
the network with FRVM reduces ASP five times on average
(i.e., ≈ 4.99 times), compared to ASP observed in the static
network.
ASP to discover multiple hosts: Fig. 4 (d) shows ASP to
discover the number of hosts in a network. In this experiment,
we setup a small network with 5 server hosts (n = 5) and 50
address space (N = 500) and computed ASP to discover 1
host, 2 hosts, 3 hosts, 4 hosts and finally all 5 hosts for both
the static network and the network with FRVM in 10 scans
(k = 10). The result shows that FRVM gradually reduces ASP
as compared to the static network.
C. Discussion
The results in Section VI show that FRVM can effectively
thwart scanning attacks by invalidating at least 37% of the
hosts/services in the worse-case scenario (i.e., scanned whole
address). These results are obtained for an equal address space
pool used by both of the attacker and defender to scanning
and multiplexing IP addresses, respectively. However, FRVM
updates only the small portion (q) of the address space during
a scanning time of the attacker. Therefore, the multiplexing
rate of FRVM is higher than the attacker scanning rate. In this
scenario, ASP in terms of discovering a target host decreases
and becomes very low. For example, if the scanner will be
able to scan only 10% of the address space (N ) and FRVM
multiplexes all the IP addresses in this time, ASP will be 9.5%
(i.e., ASP = 0.095). This implies that FRVM can effectively
protect at least 90.5 % of the hosts/services from discovery.
Similarly, if the scanner scans only 5% of the total address
space, ASP reduces to 4.8% (i.e., ASP = 0.048); and for the
1% scan, ASP further reduces to 0.9% (≈ 1%) (i.e., ASP =
0.0099). This all shows that FRVM effectively thwarts about
99% network reconnaissance of the hosts/services.
FRVM also increases the address space diversity by adding
the flexibility to have multiple vIPs per services on a host
in the network. The environment with high address space
diversity increases confusion or uncertainty for the attacker
to identify a designated target host.
In a static SDN-based network, an SDN controller makes
an entry for each host in the flow-table of OF-switch. The size
of the flow table increases as the number of hosts increases.
In FRVM, the number of IP addresses assigned to a host is
dependent upon the running serves. m denotes an average
number of active services of each host at a particular point
of time; and n denotes the number of end-hosts in the SDN-
based network. Therefore, the number of flow-table entries in
OF-switch is n×m, and the size of the flow-table changes as
the flow-table is being updated. FRVM adds some operational
delay due to the mapping and remapping IP addresses.
For multiplexing and de-multiplexing, virtual and real IP
addresses should be converted to the real and virtual IP
addresses, respectively. These address conversion operations
are performed by ‘OFPT FLOW MOD’ OpenFlow command
at the switches to which the nodes are connected. The address
conversion overhead at OF switches is negligible. The message
overhead for flow-table update between the SDN controller
and OF switches depends upon the multiplexing frequency of
FRVM mechanism while it can be mitigated by optimizing the
frequency of performing multiplexing.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
From this study, we found the following key findings:
• We proposed a Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplex-
ing (FRVM) technique as a novel SDN-based MTD
mechanism to deal with the network reconnaissance and
scanning attacks;
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Fig. 4: Comparative performance analysis with respect to the scanning attack success probability (ASP)
• We designed and developed a flexible, random IP address
mapping technique which is feasible to deploy in SDN
environments;
• We developed the architecture and communication proto-
cols of FRVM; and
• We derived probabilistic models to analyze and evaluate
the FRVM against random scanning attacks. Our results
prove that FRVM can effectively thwart scanning attacks
with the attacker success rate close to 1%.
We plan to conduct the following future work items: (1)
investigating the effectiveness of FRVM against distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks; and (2) identifying an
optimal multiplexing frequency that can effectively minimizes
the overhead derived from maintaining flow-table updates.
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